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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

by

Daniel S. Papp

22 April 1980

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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Lisa A. Ney.

FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

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THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the acceleration of the struggle for black majority rule have combined to make Southern Africa one of the major centers of contemporary international conflict.¹ These two factors alone would have been sufficient to guarantee years of turmoil in Southern Africa. Unfortunately, however, although not unexpectedly, Soviet-American rivalry has also been interjected into Southern African affairs, adding additional tension and danger to an already volatile situation.

This rivalry to a great extent has been an outgrowth of large-scale Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War, which began in 1975. That involvement and its motivation have been analyzed elsewhere,² and will not be examined here. However, very little study has been undertaken of Soviet policy toward the Southern African region as a whole. What objectives does the USSR seek to achieve in the region? What instruments of policy does the Soviet Union employ? How successful have the men in the Kremlin been in achieving their objectives, and what is the prognosis for future Soviet policy? What implications may be drawn for the United States? These and other questions will be analyzed in this study.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Soviet objectives in Southern Africa fall into three broadly defined categories.¹ The first category is composed of objectives which have been explicitly *declared* by the Soviet government. These objectives include establishing and improving relations with the front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia; strengthening and supporting national liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe; opposing and removing remaining vestiges of colonialism and racism; and supporting and aiding what the Soviet Union identifies as national independence and social progress.

The second category of Soviet objectives in Southern Africa may be viewed as a corollary of the first and includes two clear though *undeclared* aims of Soviet policy. These are the reduction of American and/or Western European influence in the area and the reduction of Communist Chinese influence in the area.

The final category of Soviet objectives is the subject of much debate in the West and includes at least three pragmatic though hypothetical Soviet goals, each of which has been specifically *denied* by the Soviet Union. This category of objectives includes obtaining military base rights and reconnaissance rights in the area; reducing American and Western European access to the rich mineral resources of the region; and threatening the oil supply lines of the United States and Western Europe, thereby accelerating the so-called "Finlandization" of Western Europe in particular.

Each of these categories will be individually examined, although it should be noted that the objectives within one category are often directly related to objectives in other categories.

Objectives Specified By the Soviet Government

Perhaps the clearest recent official Soviet government statement on its objectives in Southern Africa was the USSR's "Statement on African Policy," released on June 23, 1978. In this statement the Soviet government argued that it sought to strengthen and expand its "peaceful relations" with all legitimately-ruling African governments; to aid national liberation movements throughout Africa in their struggles against outside domination; to oppose colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism; and to support progressive programs adopted by African governments which had embarked on the noncapitalist path of development. This

statement, originally released as an apparent reaction to American charges of "Soviet expansionism" in Africa, has since been repeated by Soviet leaders and media in numerous forms and forums.⁴

The public declaration of such objectives produces certain specific dividends for the USSR. Soviet protestations calling for improved and expanded relations with legitimately ruling Africa governments provide the logical basis for expanded political, economic, military, and cultural relations with the front-line states in Southern Africa. Indeed, when former Soviet President Podgorny journeyed to Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique in March 1977, he often called for closer Soviet-African contacts. Soviet desire for improved relations with the front-line states is directly abetted by Soviet support for national liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The front-line states have been exceedingly vocal in their support for the African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Southwest Africa and the Patriotic Front, composed of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), in Zimbabwe. It is therefore not surprising that the Soviet Union supports these movements as well, although with varying degrees of moral and material backing. This is not to argue that Soviet support for these national liberation movements emanates solely from a Soviet attempt to improve its relations with the front-line nations; it is to point out that the Soviet objectives of strengthening relations with the front-line nations and of aiding national liberation movements are in many instances complementary from both the Soviet and front-line perspectives.

Much the same argument may be made for Soviet opposition to colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism. Without exception, leaders of the front-line nations and the national liberation movements in Southern Africa have verbally assaulted these vestiges of European presence in the region. Soviet leaders have followed suit. This is again comprehensible from both policy and ideological perspectives. Equally noteable are Soviet attitudes toward the rather restrained position on white rule in the region adopted by President Seretse Khama of Botswana. Soviet reaction to Khama's position has paralleled the attitudes adopted by the four other front-line states. All recognize that Botswana's restraint is determined "more by geography than preference."⁵ Thus, once

again, self-proclaimed Soviet objectives are complementary, and coincide with those of the front-line states and national liberation movements.

Finally, the declarative Soviet objective of supporting progressive governments embarked on noncapitalist paths of development theoretically coincides with the objectives of at least four of the front-line governments. Two of the ruling parties, the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo), have adopted "scientific socialism" as part of their party programs. The Soviet Union, of course, loudly supports this effort. Additionally, since 1974 the Soviet Union has even been willing to adopt lenient attitudes toward the "African socialism" of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

This evident similarity between the policy objectives which the USSR itself claims it seeks in Southern Africa and those which most front-line states and national liberation movements seek presents the Soviet Union with certain opportunities in its Southern African policies. Nevertheless, at times policy problems also develop. However, skillful manipulation of ideological precepts enables the Soviet Union to fashion its policies to minimize these difficulties.⁶ For example, with Robert Mugabe's ZANU being predominantly pro-Maoist, Soviet opposition to ZANU might have been expected. Nevertheless even though until 1978 the Soviet Union gave only small amounts of material aid to ZANU, the USSR still recognized Mugabe's faction of the Patriotic Front as a national liberation movement. Was this recognition ideologically induced, pragmatically oriented in the hope of improving reactions with ZANU in the future, or produced by a Soviet desire to once again have its objectives and policies appear congruent with those of the front-line states? While the answer to this question may never be known, it is clear that ideological differences have been conveniently overlooked.

Clear Though Unspecified Objectives

Soviet declarative objectives in Southern Africa carry with them a hidden agenda of reducing and potentially eliminating US and Chinese influence in the region. Given Soviet identification of American influences as "imperialistic" and of Chinese influence as "expansionistic," and given the existence of the real and tangible rivalry which exists between and among the three nations, it is

understandable that the USSR would seek at the very least to reduce US and Chinese influence in Southern Africa.

Soviet warnings about the danger of American imperialism in Southern Africa appear in the Soviet media on almost a daily basis. Often these warnings are coupled with admonishments that the changes in US policy toward Southern Africa which followed former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1976 Lusaka speech simply presaged new and more insidious methods to maintain and extend American positions in the region.⁷ Recent US and British efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to black rule have been similarly interpreted.⁸ Warnings about the dangers of imperialism and admonishments about the insidiousness of US policy may thus be viewed as two sides of the same coin—an effort to reduce US influence in the area.

Parallel to these efforts are Soviet desires to reduce Chinese influence in the region. Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southern Africa has long been a divisive force within the front-line nations and national liberation movements of Southern Africa. Much to Soviet chagrin, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia during their early stages of independence adopted pro-Chinese attitudes.⁹ Soviet efforts to arrange a high-level visit to these nations were repeatedly rejected until December 1976, when it was announced that Podgorny would visit the three nations in the following March. Since then the front-line states as a whole have for the most part adopted what may be termed "even-handed" policies in the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence.

The Sino-Soviet struggle for influence had impact upon the national liberation movements as well. As has already been noted, Robert Mugabe has declared that ZANU's policies are dictated by "Marxism-Leninism of Maoist thought," while ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo prefers a more orthodox Soviet model of socialism. In a more striking characterization of alleged Chinese influence in Zimbabwe TASS even accused the Chinese of extending military aid to Ian Smith's government. These accusations (April and May 1979) began even as the USSR apparently began to accelerate its aid to ZANU.¹⁰

Sino-Soviet rivalry has been well documented in the Angolan national liberation movement as well. Soviet support for the MPLA was in marked contrast to Chinese support for the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). Indeed, civil war

in that unhappy country still rages as the two socialist powers continue to give aid to their own preferred segments of the former national liberation movement. The Soviets have labelled the FNLA and UNITA "splittists" since the MPLA established control of Luanda, and have accused these movements, China, and of course the United States, of collaborating with South Africa in an effort to establish neocolonialism in Angola.¹¹

It is rather evident then that the USSR seeks to reduce and perhaps eliminate US and Chinese influence in Southern Africa. Whether the Soviet Union conversely seeks directly to increase its own influence and long-term physical presence in the region is a more debatable issue. It is this type of putative goal which comprises the third category of Soviet objectives.

Possible Although Hypothetical Objectives

Three possible Soviet objectives in South Africa include obtaining military base and reconnaissance rights in the area; reducing American and Western European access to the mineral resources of the area; and threatening the oil supply lines of the US and Western Europe. While Soviet spokesmen have regularly denied that the Soviet Union has any of these objectives,¹² doubts continue to linger about the veracity of Soviet denials.

Some of these doubts stem directly from Soviet behavior. Soviet military presence in Southern Africa has indeed been growing remarkably. Soviet reconnaissance flights do fly out of Luanda, and naval squadrons have called in Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania, the only front-line states with ports. Although reports in 1977 and 1978 of Soviet basing rights on Bazaruto Island off Mozambique and in the Seychelles Islands have proven false, it is clear that Soviet naval interest in Southern Africa has picked up. Indeed, as the Angolan Civil War heated up in early 1976, a Kotlin class destroyer, Kresta class cruiser, and an amphibious vessel with 100 to 150 troops on board cruised off Angola.

Other doubts, particularly concerning mineral resources and oil, stem directly from Southern Africa's resource wealth and strategic location. As recently as 1969, Southern Africa (including, in this case, Zaire) accounted for 69 percent of the world's gold production, 64 percent of the world's gem and industrial diamond production, 32 percent of its chromite production, 22 percent of its copper, and 28 percent of its antimony and platinum. Additionally,

57 percent of the world's known cobalt resources and 17 percent known uranium resources were in this one region.¹⁴ Given this incredible wealth and the regular Soviet condemnation of US and Western European efforts to "plunder the wealth" of the region, it is not surprising that some analysts reject Soviet denials and argue that the USSR has opted for a "strategy of mineral denial."¹⁵ At the same time, with Southern Africa astride the tanker route from the Persian Gulf to the United States and Western Europe, the Soviet presence in Southern Africa evokes fears that the western states, in the event of an East-West crisis, may be vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY

Instruments of Soviet policy toward Southern Africa may be broadly classified as diplomacy, military support, and trade and aid. It should once again be recognized that these delineations are in many instances artificial, and that the categories do in fact impact each other.

Diplomacy

Until recently, Soviet diplomatic contacts with Southern Africa have been rather limited. Soviet efforts to send a high level delegation to the independent states in the area did not succeed until 1977. While the different variations of African socialism which developed throughout Africa and particularly Tanzania and Zambia were viewed with varying degrees of hesitant support from Moscow,¹⁷ it was not really until the Portuguese colonial empire in Southern Africa collapsed and the struggle for black rule accelerated that diplomatic contacts between Moscow and the region proliferated. Table 1 illustrates this proliferation.

In addition to the increased number of recent contacts between the Soviet Union and Southern Africa, it should also be noted that these contacts took place on a higher level. Thus, two Soviet Politburo members travelled to the front-line states in 1977. Additionally, in July 1976 Vassily Solodovnikov, former Director of the African Institute of the Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Union's leading Africanist, was appointed Ambassador to Zambia. Earlier in 1976 the Soviet Union had appointed a new Ambassador to Mozambique who reportedly enjoyed easy access to President

TABLE I
Major Soviet-Southern African Visits Since 1975^a

Year	Angola	Mozambique	Namibia	S. Africa	Tanzania	Zimbabwe
1976	Jan: PH+SU	Apr: DM+SU	Aug: SWAPO Hd+SU	Apr: ANC GS+SU		Apr: ZAPU Hd+SU
	May: PM+SU	May: Pres+SU				
	Oct: Pres+SU					
1977	Sep: Pres+SU	Feb: SU Del+H	Mar: SWAPO Hd	Mar: ANC Hd	Mar: Podgorny	Feb: ZAPU
	Dec: Kirilenko A	Mar: H	Meets Podgorny	Meets Podgorny + T	Podgorny + 2a	Hd+SU
1978	Apr: Pres+SU	Nov: H Del+SU				
	Nov: Pres+SU	SU				
1979		Feb: H				
		Feb: Dep PH+H				
	Sep: Pres+SU		Feb: Dep PM+T	Feb: Dep FM+2	Dep FM+2	Jan: ZAPU Hd+SU
	Dec: A Del+SU	dies in SU				

Key: Del = Delegation; PH = Foreign Minister; PM = Prime Minister; PM = General Secretary; Hd = Head; ANC = African National Council
Dep = Deputy; GS = General Secretary; Hd = Head; ANC = African National Council
^aNo visits have been reported between the Soviet Union and Botswana.

Source: Numerous Soviet sources were used to compile this chart.

Machel.¹⁸ Finally, in August 1978 TASS reported the formation and meeting of the "Alliance of Communist and Workers' Parties of Tropical and Southern Africa."

There can be little doubt then, that diplomacy plays a key role in Soviet-southern African relations, both in state-to-state and in party-to-party relations. There can similarly be little doubt that the two most prominent events in those relations were the signing of Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Angola and Mozambique in October 1976 and February 1977 respectively, and Podgorny's March 1977 trip to the front-line states. While the treaties were notable since they were the first of their kind signed between the Soviet Union and Southern African states, Podgorny's trip marked the first occasion that a Soviet Politburo member had travelled to the region.¹⁹

The Soviet President's trip coincided with Fidel Castro's month-long tour of Africa, and on at least one occasion the Cuban leader changed his itinerary because it might have "conflicted" with the Soviet president's visit.²⁰ However, there may well have been another cause for the change in Castro's itinerary. When Castro visited Tanzania, he received lavish praise and a warm reception; when Podgorny visited Tanzania shortly after Castro left, the Soviet President received a subdued welcome despite the fact that the USSR had recently provided MIGs, tanks, and air defense components.²¹ Castro's changed itinerary may have been an effort to avoid further comparison of African attitudes toward the USSR and Cuba.

Podgorny also met with ZAPU leader Nkomo, SWAPO head Sam Nujoma and African National Council (ANC) leader Oliver Tambo. Podgorny promised all of them "permanent support" in their respective struggles.²²

Since Podgorny's trip, Soviet relations with the front-line states have remained friendly and cordial although there are clear indications of African hesitancy to become too intimate with the USSR. Soviet relations with the national liberation movements have followed suit. Indeed, an interesting twist to recent Soviet diplomatic relations with the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe is the apparent willingness of the USSR to improve its relations with ZANU and the emergence of Colonel Haile Mengistu, head of the ruling pro-Soviet Dergue in Ethiopia, as a mediator between ZAPU and ZANU.

Military Support

Soviet military support to front-line states and national liberation movements is the most visible instrument of Soviet policy in Southern Africa. It is this element of Soviet policy which has raised American, Chinese, Western European, and some African concern that the USSR has embarked on a policy of African expansion.

Until the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War, Soviet military presence in Southern Africa was minimal. In the decade 1965-74, the Soviet Union transferred only \$3 million worth of arms into all of Southern Africa. During 1975 alone, Soviet arms transfers rose to \$6 million. In 1976, the figure climbed to an astonishing \$236 million. Table 2 illustrates this growth, and contrasts it to American and Chinese arms transfers to the area.

TABLE 2
Arms Transfers to Ruling Governments³

(In Millions of Dollars)

Recipient/Source	1965-74			1975			1976		
	US	USSR	PRC	US	USSR	PRC	US	USSR	PRC
Angola ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	190	-
Mozambique ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-
Tanzania	2	2	62	-	3	-	-	25	75
Zambia	6	1	1	1	3	1	-	6	3

^aACDA cautions that these figures are not exact; no arms transfers to Botswana were reported.

^bAngola and Mozambique did not receive their independence until 1975.

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Exports and Arms Transfers 1965-74, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976.
Also the same volume for 1966-75 (published 1977), and 1967-76 (published 1978).

It should be noted that Soviet arms transfers to Zambia increased in 1976 despite the fact that Zambian President Kaunda was highly critical of Soviet involvement in the Angolan Civil War. Also, in July 1979, the Zambian defense minister travelled to East Germany in an effort to secure additional arms for his country. East Germany reportedly agreed to increase military cooperation, although the specific terms of agreement are not known.

While this chart does not include arms transfers to nonruling movements such as SWAPO, ZANU, UNITA, and FNLA, it nonetheless does illustrate the growth of Soviet military support to the ruling governments in the area. Soviet support to SWAPO, ZANU, and ZAPU has also grown since 1975, although dollar figures are not available. Western news sources have regularly carried reports of Soviet military equipment being shipped to the front-line states for transmittal to particularly ZAPU, and to lesser degrees ZANU and SWAPO.²³ This aid included T-34 and T-54 tanks, 122 millimeter rocket launchers, personnel carriers, and large quantities of small arms.²⁴ Much of the equipment was landed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Maputo and Beira, Mozambique. This aid has been transmitted to some extent through the Soviet Ministry of Defense; General S.L. Sokolov, the First Deputy Minister of Defense and a key link in Soviet arms distribution to national liberation movements, accompanied Podgorny on his 1977 trip to Africa, and reportedly met with Nujoma, Nkomo, and Tambo.

The Soviet Union, along with Cuba and certain Eastern European countries, particularly East Germany, also engages in training and advisory activities. Soviet advisors are currently in all the front-line countries except Botswana, and rumors have circulated that they have assumed some combat role in Angola and Mozambique.²⁵ It has also been reported that ZAPU and SWAPO guerrillas have trained in the Soviet Union and Cuba and returned to Zimbabwe and Namibia to fight, while South Africa has charged that Soviet-Cuban advisors have trained guerrillas in Angola to fight in both Namibia and South Africa itself. Zaire made similar charges of Soviet-Cuban complicity following guerrilla attacks into Shaba province in 1977 and 1978.²⁶ Table 3 shows the size and depth of the Soviet advisor commitment to Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular.

TABLE 3

Pro-Soviet Military Technicians in Less Developed Countries, 1976

Location	USSR/Eastern European	Cuban
Mozambique	50	350
Angola	500	10,000
All Africa	3,900	11,150
All LDC's	9,080	11,656

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World 1976, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 4.

There is little doubt that Soviet policy objectives in Southern Africa have been furthered by so-called "surrogate forces" in Southern Africa, particularly Cubans in Angola. While it is generally accepted that surrogate forces operate in Southern Africa on the volition of both the host government and the donor government, with considerable Soviet encouragement and financial support, there is little agreement on how widespread the activities of these surrogate forces currently are or will become. Potential surrogate involvement in Namibia and Zimbabwe is of particular concern to the West. However, Castro himself has said on repeated occasions that Cuban forces would give "material support" to the Patriotic Front, SWAPO, and ANC, but would never fight their battles since "independence is never delivered from abroad. The people concerned must fight for their independence."²⁷

None of the foregoing should be interpreted to imply that the Soviet exercise in "military diplomacy," if it may be termed that, has been totally successful or problem free. When the Soviet Union first expanded its military involvement in Angola, Kenneth Kaunda lambasted the Russians, warning his African compatriots that "a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs (was) now coming in through the back door." Soviet-Zambian relations froze, not to be improved until a year later when Podgorny visited Zambia.

Botswana has also apparently had doubts about Soviet intentions in Africa. Although Botswana has had fewer contacts with the USSR than any other front-line state, a curious episode in late 1976 nonetheless illustrated this point. A senior government official in Gaborone declared that his nation "would consider" Soviet military aid to help repulse Rhodesian border attacks; the Soviet Union quickly responded that it would consider an "official request" for such aid.²⁸ To date, Botswana has not made an official request. (In late 1977, Botswana formed a 2,000-man "army" to protect its borders from Rhodesian attacks on refugee camps within its territory. The "army" was armed primarily with British weapons).

Even the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Angola and Mozambique have apparently been the source of some contention in Soviet-front-line-nation military relations. The Soviet-Mozambique pact, for example, declares that "in the case of situations tending to threaten or disturb the peace," the two nations would "enter into immediate contact with the aim of coordinating their position in the interest of eliminating the threat or reestablishing peace." In the years since the treaty was signed, Rhodesia has launched punitive air strikes and ground operations into Mozambique primarily against ZANU guerrilla bases. These attacks have been carried out with impunity. Until recently, the only air defense capabilities the USSR provided the Maputo government were a few MIG-17's. It may well have been because of this apparent Soviet hesitancy to provide the military aid Mozambique expected under the terms of the treaty that Machel showed a new willingness to turn to the United States. The Mozambiquean President described his October 1977 meeting with Jimmy Carter as the start of a "new era" in US-Mozambique relations. Subsequent Soviet deliveries of SAM-7 air defense missiles and warnings to Rhodesia that Mozambique was "not alone" in facing Salisbury's attacks²⁹ somewhat assuaged Machel's disenchantment, but Brezhnev's recent comments that the Soviet-Mozambique treaty was nonmilitary in nature undoubtedly increased it once again, even though the Soviet leader's statement was probably directed at a Western audience.³⁰

Soviet military relations with national liberation movements, particularly those of Zimbabwe, have been no less complicated. We have already viewed Moscow's putative support for the Patriotic

Front, even though in actuality the USSR funnelled most of its military support to only ZAPU. Robert Mugabe commented on this reality in an October 2, 1978 *Newsweek* interview declaring that his segment of the Patriotic Front had not received much support from either the Soviet Union or Cuba. (He also commented that he did not understand why this was true. This hardly seems believable, given the fact that he declared ZANU's philosophy "Marxism-Leninism of Maoist thought." Obviously, this does not sell in Moscow). Even so, again as already observed, the USSR has moved to a more even-handed position *vis-a-vis* ZAPU and ZANU. This does not mean, however, that Moscow's problems within the Patriotic Front are solved, even if the Mengistu mediation proves successful. As recently as 1976, ZANU trainees with their Chinese advisors attacked ZAPU recruits in Tanzania.³¹ Such animosity, grounded in ideology, tribalism, ego, and the drive for power, may not be easy to overcome.

There is yet another problem that Soviet military diplomacy must overcome: mounting casualties. While the Soviet Union itself has suffered few personnel losses, the same is not true of its Cuban surrogate. Although no large-scale opposition to Cuba's involvement in Africa has as yet surfaced in the Caribbean island, the fact remains that over 1,500 Cubans have died on that continent, over 1,000 in Angola alone. Reports from Angola indicate that Cuban forces have been reluctant to move along the critical Benguela rail line in central Angola because of the high casualties exacted by UNITA forces in the area.³²

One remaining point should be analyzed in our discussion of Soviet military support for front-line nations and the national liberation movements. Does this considerable Soviet emphasis on military relations in the area indicate that the USSR opposes a peaceful and/or negotiated transition to black majority rule in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and eventually South Africa? While the men in the Kremlin have rarely, if ever, declared that a nonmilitary solution to the transition problem was impossible, it is exceedingly clear that they believe it is improbable on terms which they view as acceptable. US and British efforts to arrange peaceful transitions of power in Zimbabwe and Namibia have been regularly decried as efforts to maintain white domination and neocolonial control. This was also true of the original "all parties" conference proposal, the frustrated UN Namibian election solution, the various "internal" solutions, and the compromise conference solution reached at the

British Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka in August, 1979.¹³ Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole were even categorized as the "local African puppets" of the United States and Great Britain.¹⁴ To the Soviets, a peaceful solution to the situation was simple: transfer political power to the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia.¹⁵ Both, in Soviet eyes, were the only legitimate representatives of their respective people.

Given these Soviet attitudes toward a peaceful settlement of the Zimbabwe situation, it is not too surprising that the Soviet media and government were rather reticent in their commentary on the results of the fall 1979 London Conference. The Soviet media regularly attributed the successes of the conference to the "flexible and realistic" attitudes of the United Patriotic Front, and the difficulties of the conference to the "self-serving" policies of the Muzorewa government and the British government. *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* both warned that despite the appearance of progress, numerous difficulties remained, imposed by the Muzorewa-British effort to retain privileges for whites and by the possibility of introducing mercenaries from the West to the conflict. The distinct impression created (and it should be stressed, this is only an impression) was that the Soviet leadership was taken aback by the settlement, and believed that its influence in the area had been further reduced.

Trade and Aid

Soviet trade and aid in Southern Africa has shown no growth since 1975. The only major exception to this rule is Soviet trade with Angola. Table 4 shows Soviet trade figures for 1975 through 1978 with the front-line states, while Table 5 illustrates the pattern of aid Southern Africa states have received from the Soviet Union, Eastern European states, and the PRC.

Given the economic hardships brought about by Southern African conflicts, and given the relatively underdeveloped status of Southern African economies, it is somewhat surprising that the USSR has not chosen to direct more trade and aid to Southern Africa. Soviet authorities maintain that trade and aid are instruments for "strengthening national and economic independence" and are therefore "useful weapons" against imperialism,¹⁶ but, at least through 1979, have employed neither extensively in pursuit of their policy objectives in southern Africa.

TABLE 4
Soviet Trade with the Front-Line States^a
(In Millions of Rubles)

Country	1975		1976		1977		1978	
	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports
Angola	-	-	5.3	14.4	69.2	10.4	47.8	9.6
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	5.9	-	17.4	.8
Tanzania	2.6	5.9	1.2	2.8	1.2	3.5	6.2	3.4
Zambia	-	7.5	2.3	-	1.4	.4	.6	.8
ALL LDC's	3310.0	2998.8	3740.1	2827.0	5336.7	2997.2	5726.4	2831.2

^aNo trade figures were reported for Botswana

Source: Foreign Trade (Moscow), Number 3 (March, 1977), supplement; Foreign Trade (Moscow), Number 12 (December, 1978), supplement; and Foreign Trade (Moscow), Number 3 (March, 1979), supplement.

TABLE 5
Communist Economic Credits and Grants
(In Millions of Dollars)

Recipient ^a /Source	1954-74			1975			1976		
	USSR	E. Europe	PRC	USSR	E. Europe	PRC	USSR	E. Europe	PRC
Angola ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	-
Mozambique ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	3	1
Tanzania	20	13	331	-	-	-	-	-	28
Zambia	6	50	279	-	-	-	-	-	28

^aNo credits or grants were reported for Botswana.

^bAngola and Mozambique did not receive their independence until 1975.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World 1976,
Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 11-12.

There are several reasons for this. First, speaking in pragmatic historical terms, trade and aid have not proven overly effective in providing long-term reductions of the influence of potential opponents, nor in providing long-term increases in one's own influence. The Soviet Union, the United States, and China have all discovered this. Second, the Soviet Union itself is concentrating on internal development, and thus extends limited credit and offers little aid. Third, Soviet trade authorities apparently seek to have a surplus in trade balance with the developing countries, perhaps to offset the trade deficit the USSR has with developed countries. For example in 1975 the Soviet Union exported 3,310 million rubles worth of goods to developing countries, and imported 2,998.8 million rubles worth of goods from them. Three years later Soviet exports to these same countries had climbed to 5,726.4 million rubles, while imports had actually *dropped* to 2,831.2 million rubles.

Finally, Southern African states themselves may be somewhat hesitant to become too closely tied in an economic sense to the USSR. The West has capital to invest; the USSR does not. Thus, the presidents of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia have all recently called for increased Western investments in their respective countries during the very period when Soviet interest in Southern Africa has been increasing.³⁷ Even in the one exception to the prevalent Soviet trade pattern in Southern Africa, Angola, trade has dropped off considerably since 1977. Most significantly, almost all of the drop has been in Angolan imports of Soviet goods. It may well be that Angolan and other Southern African leaders concur with an upper level official from Mozambique who declared, "We don't intend to become another Bulgaria here, and we certainly do not want to get involved in bloc politics."³⁸

In sum, then, while the USSR argues that trade and aid are significant instruments of policy, the men in the Kremlin employ neither extensively in their efforts to attain their Southern African objective. Soviet policy toward Southern Africa continues to be dominated by diplomatic and military factors, with no change of emphasis in sight.

EXTRANEous IMPACTS ON SOVIET POLICY

Regardless of what objectives the USSR seeks in Southern Africa, and regardless of what instruments of policy it chooses to

employ, certain local, regional, and international factors obviously contribute to the success or failure of Soviet policy in the region. In general terms, these extraneous factors include but are not limited to nationalist sentiments, disagreements between various segments of national liberation movements, pragmatic economic considerations, and countermoves adopted by other non-African nations.

Nationalism

Nationalist sentiment in the front-line states appears both to aid the Soviet Union in its efforts to reduce US and Chinese influence in the region and to hinder the Soviet Union in its attempts to expand its own influence in the area. This nationalism has often manifested itself in an unwillingness to become or remain dependent on non-African actors. Rather, in their brief histories of independence, Southern African states have in most cases been willing to accept economic, military, and technical assistance from any nation willing to extend it. This has led to continual frustrations for non-African states involved in the area.

In Angola, Agostinho Neto regularly declared his government's intention to repay all aid it received from the Soviet Union. Despite the decisive importance of Soviet and Cuban military support to the MPLA, as early as July 1976 reports began surfacing of disagreements between the Soviets and Neto about the nonaligned stance Neto reportedly preferred.³⁹ Less than a year later, an abortive coup against Neto, led by pro-Soviet elements of the MPLA, was put down by Neto loyalists and Cuban troops.⁴⁰ In November 1978, amid reports that the Angolan government was seeking to strengthen its ties to the West, Neto appeared on Moscow television and declared that his country was grateful to the Soviet Union for its support, but at the same time wanted peaceful relations with all countries and intended to remain nonaligned.⁴¹ A month later, Neto removed yet another pro-Soviet MPLA member from power (Premier Lopo de Nascimento), and again affirmed that it was necessary at all times to defend national independence.

Following Neto's death in September 1979, Angolan sources revealed additional specifics about Soviet-Angolan disagreement during Neto's presidency. The more striking revelations included Neto's 1977 request to the Portuguese government for 20,000 troops to replace the Cubans (Portugal declined the request); Neto's refusal to grant Soviet base rights; and at least three

assassination attempts by pro-Soviet segments of the MPLA.

Since Neto's death, there has been no noticeable change in Soviet-Angolan relations. The new president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, pledged to continue Neto's policies, including seeking Western investment and remaining nonaligned. While Brezhnev and dos Santos exchanged messages on the third anniversary of their nations' Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, there was nothing of moment in the exchange.⁴²

The Soviet Union's policy toward Mozambique immediately following the African country's 1975 independence succeeded in substantially increasing Soviet influence in Maputo. This increased Soviet influence was at the expense of the PRC, which temporarily decreased its involvement in African affairs following its futile support for the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. Samora Machel regularly described his country's relations with the USSR as "exemplary" throughout 1976 and early 1977, but as Soviet economic and military aid to Mozambique remained inconsequential, the Mozambican president began to look to the West for assistance, particularly as Rhodesian raids into his country against ZANU guerrilla bases located there increased in frequency and ferocity.⁴³ Machel has both called for Western investment in Mozambique, and proclaimed a "new era" in relations with the United States. Perhaps most telling, in February 1979 L.F. Ilichev, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Mozambique for discussions of "comradely frankness" with Machel. As analysts of Soviet politics know, "comradely frankness" implies that serious disagreements exist.

Soviet-Tanzanian relations have also followed a varied path, although they have never been truly warm. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere has been highly critical of the West for its apparent lack of support for majority rule in Southern Africa, and at the same time has been highly supportive of the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa. This, he explained, was because the threat of Southern African independence was greater from the West than from the East. Nonetheless, there has been little Soviet military or economic support to the Nyerere government. Nyerere himself appears quite cognizant that Soviet objectives in the region may not be identical to Southern African objectives. As the Tanzanian president observed, "Why countries gave arms to the MPLA is a matter which they know and others can only conjecture. What is certain is that

the arms were obtained, and used. They were used by nationalists for nationalistic purposes.⁴⁴ Even more pointedly, Nyerere has declared, "Tanzania does not want anyone from outside Africa to govern Africa."⁴⁵

Zambian relations with the Soviet Union, although never close, became extremely cold following Kaunda's "plundering tiger with cubs" statement concerning Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola. Kaunda's praise of Chinese support for national liberation movements further alienated the Russians.⁴⁶ Although Soviet support for ZAPU, the segment of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front operating primarily out of Zambia, has succeeded in somewhat closing the Soviet-Zambian gap, it is still evident that the two governments are far from close. During 1979, however, the Muzorewa government launched air strikes against ZAPU in Zambia. In response to these strikes, Zambia unsuccessfully sought Western military aid. Kaunda's government then turned to East Germany, and has apparently received at least some unspecified military aid.

On the whole then, the front-line states have been unwilling to maintain extremely close ties with the USSR. To be sure, when the USSR has offered military aid, the African states have taken it. Rhodesian attacks on Patriotic Front bases in the front-line states, and South African attacks on SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia may influence the front-line states to seek even more military aid from the USSR if negotiated settlements fail, but if their history of avoiding dependence is any indication, such steps need not necessarily be advantageous to the USSR. Nationalism in Southern Africa is without doubt a force with which the USSR must contend.

National Liberation Rivalry

Rivalry within the various national liberation movements is a second major factor which complicates Soviet policy toward Southern Africa. In Angola, of course, civil war still rages between the MPLA, which currently controls the government, and the FNLA and UNITA. Because of their erstwhile support from the United States, China, and Southern Africa, the latter two segments of the one-time national liberation movement have been labelled "splittists" by the Kremlin. While a non-Marxist would probably term the split between the three movements as tribal or regional in origin, the USSR terms it ideological, and caused by Western

neocolonial intrigues. It has been clear for some time, however, that in this intramovement rivalry, the Soviets have opted for the MPLA.

The MPLA itself, however, has shown signs of fracture. The May 27, 1977 coup attempt against Neto was carried out by the pro-Soviet wing of the MPLA. Thus, even within the MPLA, the USSR may in the future be forced to make difficult decisions about which wing to support.

In Namibia, SWAPO appears to be the only major political force which actively seeks independence and black majority rule. The Soviet Union—and indeed, much of the world—is firmly behind SWAPO in its efforts. The Turnhalle Alliance, a white-dominated political organization in Namibia, is generally viewed as a surrogate for continued white control. The Soviet Union concurs.

In South Africa, Soviet support is tendered to both the ANC and the South African Communist Party. Currently, neither organization is particularly influential, although it may be expected that particularly the ANC's strength will increase.

It is in Zimbabwe that the USSR faces difficult choices. While the "internal solution" advocated by Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau was vehemently condemned by the Soviet Union, and while the USSR ardently supports the Patriotic Front of ZANU and ZAPU, until recently almost all Soviet aid and support was directed to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. However, unfortunately for the Soviets, Robert Mugabe's ZANU has become the stronger military force, receiving aid from a variety of sources. Since mid-1978, as previously noted, the USSR has shown a pronounced increase in support of ZANU. The unified front adopted by ZANU and ZAPU for the London Conference reduced the problem of intra-national liberation movement rivalry for the Soviets, but raised an even more disquieting prospect: a solution to the Zimbabwe situation which prescribed Soviet influence in the country. Obviously, from the Soviet perspective, such a solution is not preferred.

Economics

The internecine warfare of the last half-decade has seriously degraded the national economies of all states in the region. In Angola, the civil war has closed the Benuela rail line and destroyed what little industry the country had. White flight following independence had an adverse impact on both Angola and Mozam-

bique, and the latter's 1976 closure of its border with Rhodesia has undermined Mozambique's economy as much as Rhodesia's. In 1977, Zambia closed its border with Rhodesia as well, but in later 1978 reopened the railway in order to receive much needed imports landed in South Africa. Zambia's one other rail link to the sea, the Tazara (Tanzam) railroad, is operating considerably under its peak efficiency.¹ Zambia and Angola, in short, are facing bankruptcy, and Mozambique's economy is sustained to a great extent by Mozambican workers in South African mines. To an extent, the same is true of Botswana. In the white-dominated areas of the regions, white flight and civil war is eroding Zimbabwe's economy, and Namibia relies primarily on mining. Only South Africa remains economically strong.

The implications for Soviet policy are obvious: the entire region, regardless of the outcomes of the Namibia and Zimbabwe situations, is in dire need of economic assistance, and the Soviet Union has extended very little. While it may be that Soviet policy will change once those situations are resolved, there is nothing to indicate that it will. Indeed, it may be that economic exigencies forced the front-line states to apply pressure to the national liberation movements to accept gradual transition to black rule. The need for military equipment, if these transitions are successful, will obviously be reduced, thereby depriving the USSR of one of its two effective instruments of policy in Southern Africa.

Non-African Countermoves

Increased Soviet activity in Southern Africa has directly precipitated increased Western activity in the region, primarily on the part of Great Britain and the United States. Indeed, it may safely be argued that the entire face of US policy toward Southern Africa has been altered by the Soviet presence there. In his 1976 Lusaka speech, former US Secretary of State Kissinger promised American support for black majority rule. Since that time, the United States has diplomatically supported the front-line states and the national liberation movements, and in conjunction with Great Britain has continually sought to arrange an acceptable peaceful transition to black rule. The acceptance of the various proposals put forward by the British at the London Conference by both the "internal" and "external" forces has lent additional weight to Julius Nyerere's observation that a political change has occurred in Zimbabwe.¹² Perhaps even more strikingly, both the United States

and Great Britain have taken steps to increase their economic aid to the region. Thus, on July 31, 1979, perhaps in "preparation" for the Commonwealth Conference held in Lusaka in early August, Great Britain cancelled the debt on \$1.74 billion in loans it had previously made to Commonwealth nations, including Botswana and Tanzania; and in mid-November 1979 Great Britain ended its economic sanctions against Zimbabwe. The United States followed the British lead in December.

China, meanwhile, has slowed its economic support to the front-line states since Mao's death and since the MPLA victory in Angola. China's major economic impact in the region was the construction of the Tanzam railroad, which was turned over to the African states in 1976. Even with its reduced interest in the area, however, the PRC saw fit to donate a squadron of MIG-19's to Zambia for air defense in 1978.⁴⁹

The Soviet Union, of course, argues that these policies of other non-African states are neocolonial in nature. The Soviet media is particularly fond of accusing the United States, China, and to a lesser degree Great Britain of cooperating to establish regional hegemony.⁵⁰ In any event, the USSR recognizes that these nations retain considerable influence throughout Southern Africa, and that their success or failure in extending economic and military aid and arranging a peaceful transition to black majority rule will go a long way toward determining the success or failure of Soviet policy in the region.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, it cannot be argued that Soviet policy has been especially successful in achieving its objectives in Southern Africa. To be sure, Western and Chinese influence in Southern Africa has perceptively decreased, while Soviet influence has increased. However, it is difficult to conclude that this is the result of Soviet policy. Harold Macmillan, in his 1960 Capetown speech, observed that "winds of change" were sweeping Southern Africa; by today, those winds have reached hurricane force, and Soviet policy by itself adds very little to them.

Nonetheless, large-scale Soviet interest in Southern Africa necessitates careful policy responses on the part of the United States. As we have seen neither the front-line states or the national

liberation movements appear inclined to adopt a blindly pro-Soviet or anti-American stance in the long term. To some extent, the Soviet Union is relying on hope of a lack of political sophistication on the part of the black African states in its efforts to persuade them that the United States is trying to maintain white minority governments and establish neocolonial control. So far, the African states appear too sophisticated to accept the Soviet line.

Hopefully the United States itself will be sophisticated enough not to overreact to this Soviet gambit in Southern Africa. President Carter in his June 1978 Annapolis speech and US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon in his October 1978 Atlanta speech both gave indications of such sophistication. Carter observed that even some Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a role model. Toon maintained that in the long run he did not expect any substantial Soviet presence in Africa because of the factors discussed above.

If there is danger of over-reacting, however, there is also danger of under-reacting. As Donald Zagoria has pointed out, seven pro-Communist movements have seized power with armed force in Africa or Asia since 1975.¹¹ In the crudest global context, such a fact inevitably creates in the minds of many people the image that "winds of change" are blowing not only in Southern Africa against white-minority rule, but also throughout the world against the United States. To do nothing would be to create the appearance that the United States has in effect conceded the field to the USSR.

In the final analysis, the future of Southern Africa will be determined by the people of the region itself. But it must be remembered that the future which they choose will be influenced by forces both internal and external to the region, and it is this fact which makes Soviet policy toward the region of continuing vital interest for both the United States and the governments of Southern Africa themselves.

ENDNOTES

1. For the purpose of this paper, Southern Africa has been somewhat arbitrarily defined as the white-dominated states of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Southwest Africa (the last two of which hereafter will be identified by their respective African names of Zimbabwe and Namibia); and the black-ruled front-line states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
2. For just a few of these discussions, see John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978; Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," *Strategic Review*, Summer, 1976; Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1975," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring-Summer, 1978, pp. 3-34; and Daniel S. Papp, "Angola, National Liberation, and the Soviet Union," *Parameters*, March 1978, pp. 26-39.
3. For other analyses of Soviet objectives in Southern Africa, see US Library of Congress, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Politics*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, May 1977; and "Communist Penetration in Africa," *Africa Institute Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1978, pp. 62-69.
4. See, for example, L.I. Brezhnev, "In the Name of the Happiness of Soviet People," *Vital Speeches*, Vol. XLV, No. 12, April 1979, p. 371; V. Vorob'yev, "Colonialist Policies in Africa," *International Affairs*, No. 9, September 1978, pp. 47-48; D. Volsky, "Southern Africa: Protracted Convulsion," *New Times*, No. 22, May 1979, p. 7; G. Roshchin, "International Monopoly Expansion in Africa," *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1979, pp. 68-69; and *Izvestiia*, January 31, 1979.
5. For a discussion of this Soviet attitude, see Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-African Relations*, London: Central Asian Research Center, 1974, p. 16.
6. For a detailed development of this argument, see Daniel S. Papp, *Toward an Estimate of the Soviet Worldview*, Military Issues Research Memorandum, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, March 15, 1979. For the application of this argument specifically to the national liberation movement, see Daniel S. Papp, "National Liberation During Detente: The Soviet Outlook," *International Journal*, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, Winter 1976-77, pp. 82-99.
7. See, for example, Roshchin, p. 5; and *Izvestiia*, January 12, 1979. In his April 1976 Lusaka speech, Kissinger declared American support for black majority rule throughout Southern Africa.
8. See *Pravda*, December 11, 1978; *Radio Moscow*, August 6, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: *Soviet Union*, (hereafter FBIS: *Soviet Union*) August 8, 1979.
9. Mozambique attained independence in 1975, Tanzania in 1961, and Zambia in 1964.
10. According to one report, Soviet bloc arms comprised roughly 30 percent of ZANU's armaments in the summer of 1978, and 80 percent in the summer of 1979. See "Can It Last," *African Confidential*, Vol. 20, No. 12, June 6, 1979, p. 2; and "Nkomo's Isolation," *African Confidential*, Vol. 20, No. 13, June 20, 1979, p. 1.
11. V. Sofinsky and A. Khazanov, "Angolan Chronicle of the Peking Betrayal," *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1978, pp. 60-69.

12. Brezhnev and Gromyko in particular have denied such objectives. See also Vorobyov, pp. 47-48, and V. Kudryavtsev, "Africa Fights for its Future," *International Affairs*, No. 5, May 1978, p. 38.

13. *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1976.

14. William Minter, *Portuguese Africa and the West*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, p. 166.

15. See *Pravda*, October 24, 1978; *Izvestiia*, October 3, 1978, December 5, 1978, and January 12, 1978; and M. Alexandrov, "Southern Africa-The Struggle Continues," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 5, May 1979, pp. 53-54.

16. Peter Janke, "The Soviet Strategy of Mineral Denial," *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 7, No. 22, November 1978, pp. 5-6.

17. See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet View of African Socialism" in *On the Road to Communism*, ed. by Roger Kanet, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1972; and McLane, pp. 145-154, and pp. 174-178.

18. *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1976.

19. Three measures of the importance the Kremlin attached to Podgorny's trip was the size of his delegation (120 members); his mode of arrival (Tu-144, the Soviet equivalent of the Concorde); and the timing of his visit (during Cyrus Vance's abortive trip to Moscow for SALT negotiations).

20. This was in Zambia. See *The Washington Post*, March 29, 1977.

21. *Ibid.*, March 24, 1977. Another indication of some degree of Soviet-Tanzanian disagreement was the final communique issued by the Soviet and Tanzanian governments, which noted merely that the formation of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe the previous fall was an "important step" in the struggle to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe. The Soviets had hoped to convince Tanzanian President Nyerere to endorse the Front as the sole legitimate representative of the Zimbabwe people.

22. *Ibid.*, March 29, 1977. Podgorny returned to the Soviet Union on April 3, and on May 24 was removed from the Politburo. There is no apparent linkage between his African trip and his removal.

23. For references in *The New York Times* during 1976 alone, see March 10, June 21, November 18, and November 30.

24. *The Washington Post*, March 28, 1977.

25. See, for example, *The Atlanta Constitution*, August 30, 1979, where it was reported that five Soviet advisors participating in an action against anti-Frelimo forces in Mozambique had been killed.

26. *The New York Times*, April 24, 1977; and *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1977, June 22, 1977; and May 22, 1979.

27. *The Washington Post*, March 23, 1977. See also *The Washington Post*, April 2, 1977; and *Facts on File* 1977, p. 456.

28. *The Washington Post*, December 22, 1976.

29. *Izvestiia*, December 15, 1978.

30. Brezhnev, p. 371.

31. *The Washington Post*, August 23, 1976.

32. "The UNITA Thorn," *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 20, No. 11, May 23, 1979, p. 1.

33. For Soviet reaction to these proposals, ideas, and steps, see for example *Izvestiia*, December 15, 1978; January 15, 1978; January 24, 1979; and August 8, 1979; and *Pravda*, January 31, 1979; and February 1, 1979.

34. *Izvestia*, December 15, 1978.
35. *Pravda*, November 5, 1978; and V. Sidenko, "The 'International Settlement' Farce," *New Times*, No. 20, May 1979, pp. 10-11.
36. B. Kozintsev and P. Kashelov, "Economic Cooperations of the USSR with the Countries of Tropical Africa," *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1978, p. 30.
37. *The Washington Post*, December 13, 1977; and December 15, 1977; and *Africa Report*, No. 2, March-April, 1979, p. 32.
38. *The Washington Post*, February 16, 1977.
39. *Ibid.*, July 16, 1976.
40. See *Ibid.*, June 28, 1977; *The New York Times*, June 20, 1977; and David Birmingham, "The Twenty Seventh of May," *African Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 309, October 1978.
41. Moscow Television, as reported in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, November 15, 1978, p. 112.
42. *Pravda*, October 8, 1979; and October 9, 1979.
43. For a interesting discussion on Mozambiquean affairs, see Thomas H. Heniksen, "Marxism and Mozambique," *African Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 309, October 1978, pp. 441-462.
44. Julius Nyerere, "The Conflict is Not a Fight between Communists and Anti-Communists," *The Washington Post*, January 12, 1976.
45. Julius Nyerere, "Foreign Troops in Africa," *African Report*, Vol. 23, No. 4, July-August 1978, pp. 10-14.
46. Colin Legum, "The End of Cloud-Cuckoo Land," *The New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1976, p. 60.
47. *Los Angeles Times*, October 1, 1978.
48. *The Washington Post*, August 4, 1979.
49. *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1979.
50. See *Izvestia*, October 26, 1978; Radio Moscow, October 29, 1978, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, October 31, 1978, p. H2; Radio Moscow, December 20, 1978, in *FBIS: Soviet Union*, December 22, 1978; and *Izvestia*, January 17, 1979.
51. Donald Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4, Spring 1979, p. 733.

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